ABSTRACT The smart grid is becoming one of the fundamental cyber-physical systems due to the employment of information and communication technology. In the smart grid, demand-side management (DSM) based on real-time pricing is an important mechanism for improving the reliability of the grid. Electricity retailers in the smart grid can procure electricity from various supply sources, and then sell it to the customers. Therefore, it is critical for retailers to make effective procurement and price decisions. In this paper, we propose a novel game-theoretical decision-making scheme for electricity retailers in the smart grid using real-time pricing DSM. We model and analyze the interactions between the retailer and electricity customers as a four-stage Stackelberg game. In the first three stages, the electricity retailer, as the Stackelberg leader, makes decisions on which electricity sources to procure electricity from, how much electricity to procure, and the optimal retail price to offer to the customers, to maximize its profit. In the fourth stage, the customers, who are the followers in the Stackelberg game, adjust their individual electricity demand to maximize their individual utility. Simulation results show that the retailer and customers can achieve a higher profit and higher utility using our proposed decision-making scheme. We also analyze how the system parameters affect the procurement and price decisions in the proposed decision-making scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a critical infrastructure, the electricity power grid forms one of the largest complex interconnected networks. The current power grid is managed through an old-fashioned centralized cyber-infrastructure, referred to as supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) [1] . A failure in one location can quickly propagate across the grid, and can also lead to a cascading failure and wide-spread blackouts, such as the 2003 US Midwest blackout [2] .
Power grid infrastructure is experiencing a significant shift from the traditional electricity grid to the smart grid. The electricity demand of consumers has sharply increased in recent years. There is increasing interest in integrating renewable resources into the power grid, in order to decrease greenhouse gas emissions. Demand-side management (DSM), such as dynamic pricing, and demand response programs are used to improve the reliability of the grid. These new requirements and the aging of the existing grid make the modernization of the grid infrastructure a necessity. The smart grid incorporates new technologies such as advanced metering, automation, communication, distributed generation, and distributed storage [3] . The smart grid can optimize electricity generation, transmission, and distribution, reduce peaks in power usage, and sense and prevent power blackouts [4] . Therefore, the smart grid has the potential to significantly improve the efficiency and reliability of the power grid.
The smart grid is composed of a pair of infrastructures: a physical infrastructure and a cyber infrastructure [1] , [5] . The electrical energy flows over the physical infrastructure. The cyber infrastructure is a large number of communication and computing networks, including wide-area monitoring, two way communications and enhanced control functions, which allows the interaction and feedback of socio-economic networks through the energy market [6] . The physical infrastructure is tightly coupled with the cyber infrastructure. Due to the employment of information and communication technology, the smart grid is becoming one of the fundamental cyber-physical systems [2] .
In the smart grid, demand-side management (DSM) is an important mechanism for improving the reliability of the grid by dynamically changing or shifting the electricity consumption [7] . DSM can help utilities operate more efficiently, reduce emission of greenhouse gases, and also decrease the cost for electricity consumers. DSM strategies include load shifting and control [8] - [10] , dynamic pricing (e.g., real-time pricing, time-of-use pricing) [11] - [14] , and incentive-based demand response (DR) [15] - [17] . Real-time pricing is one of the most important DSM strategies, where the prices offered by retailers change frequently to reflect variations in the cost of the energy supply [14] , [18] and the electricity demand of the customers over time.
In an electricity market, retailers procure electricity from various electricity sources (e.g., the pool, electricity derivatives, and self-production units), and then sell it to customers [19] . These electricity sources have different characteristics, and these characteristics might change over time. For example, the pool price is uncertain and volatile, and the costs of the other electricity source options are generally higher than the expected pool price [19] , [20] . In the smart grid, renewable energy sources are also integrated into the power grid. These renewable energy sources are highly intermittent in nature and often uncontrollable. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between different electricity sources. On the other hand, the electricity demand of the customers might vary with time. Therefore, retailers need to make effective decisions about electricity sources, the electricity amount they procure and the price to offer to the customers.
There is some work in the literature related to retail electric power operations. Triki et al. discussed the real-time pricing with an adjustable customer base line [21] . Carrion et al. presented a stochastic programming methodology to determine the optimal retail price based on fixed pricing and the amounts of power procured from the pool and forward contracts [22] . Karandikar et al. used a capital asset pricing model to determine the electricity prices for retailers [23] . Celebi et al. developed a computable equilibrium model to estimate the time-of-use (TOU) rates based on the costs of different power generation [24] . Yusta et al. discussed how different price strategies affect the retailers' profit [25] . Gabriel et al. analyzed a set of strategies available to the retailers to determine the forward loads [26] . Gabriel et al. proposed a stochastic optimization model to determine the optimal forward loads and retail price [27] .
Most of the existing work mainly focuses on one or two decisions, price decision, electricity source decisions or the electricity amount they procure decisions, which need to be made by retailers. These strategies are mainly for the retailers in the traditional power grid. To the best of our knowledge, no much work has been done for making optimal decisions about electricity sources and the amount that retailers should procure and the price to offer to the customers in the smart grid, especially when real-time pricing DSM is used. It is also very important to analyze how the retailer interacts with its customers and how its decisions affect the customers' satisfaction level, taking the impact of supply uncertainty into consideration.
In this paper, we propose a novel game-theoretical decision-making scheme for electricity retailers in the smart grid, where real-time pricing DSM is used. We assume that retailers are price-taking retailers, who do not affect the prices offered by the supply sources. We use various utility functions to model the electricity customers' preferences and electricity consumption patterns. A real-time demand response scheme is used by the customers to adjust their electricity demand to maximize their individual utility. We model and analyze the interactions between the retailer and electricity customers as a four-stage Stackelberg game [28] . The first three stages of the game analyze how the retailers should make decisions on which electricity sources to procure electricity from, how much electricity to procure, and what would be the optimal retail price to offer to the customers, in order to maximize profit. The fourth stage of the game shows how customers dynamically adjust their electricity demand with the offered retail price to maximize individual utility. Simulation results show the retailer and customers can achieve a higher profit and higher utility using our proposed decisionmaking scheme and how the system parameters affect the procurement and price decisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We model the interactions between the retailer and the customers as a four-stage Stackelberg game in Section II. The Stackelberg game is analyzed through backward induction in Section III. Simulation results are presented and discussed in Section IV. Finally, we conclude this study in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In the smart grid, an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and smart meters are needed to provide two-way real-time communications between retailers and customers. There are two major types of information flows in the network: control data is exchanged between the retailers and the customers, and monitoring and metering data is transmitted from the customers to the retailers.
In order to make efficient decisions, each retailer needs to learn customers' preferences and electricity consumption patterns. Therefore, each retailer can be equipped with several software tools: a database, a data-mining engine and a decision-making tool. A database stores the historical electricity consumption value of each customer. The data-mining engine is used to forecast the future consumption of each customer through his/her historical consumption data. The decision-making tool helps retailers to make market decisions. Various incentive programs can also be used by the retailers to encourage customers to provide their accurate VOLUME 1, NO. 1, JUNE 2013
electricity demand values and their electricity preferences in advance.
A. REAL-TIME ELECTRICITY DEMAND MODEL FOR CUSTOMERS
In an electricity market, different electricity consumers require different levels of electricity, and might feel different level of satisfaction with the same price and amount of consumed electricity. In addition, a customer's satisfaction with the same level of electricity consumption can vary with time. The dynamic behaviors of customers can be accurately modeled by utility functions [29] . The utility of a customer can be modeled by a quadratic function with the following two requirements [13] : First, it is a concave function of the electricity consumption. Second, the corresponding electricity demand function of each customer needs to be linear, in order to simplify the analysis of pricing. Therefore, the utility function of an arbitrary user i can be defined as follows:
where X i is a parameter that may vary among customers and at different times of the day, d i denotes the electricity consumption level of customer i, α i is a pre-determined parameter, and p is the price provided by the retailer. Real-time pricing DSM is used by retailers, since it is an effective tool to guide and influence the electricity consumption behavior of customers [7] . Each customer adjusts his/her electricity consumption level in response to real-time electricity prices offered by the retailers to maximize its utility. The electricity consumption level of each customer can be calculated based on his/her utility function. We differentiate U i (p, d i ) with respect to d i to attain his/her consumption function. Therefore, The electricity consumption function D i ( p) of customer i can be expressed as follows:
If there are |I| users served by a retailer, where |I| is the cardinality of customer set I, the total electricity demand is as follows:
In the rest of the paper, F stands for
and G stands for i∈I
for simple presentation. In the smart grid, bi-directional communications between a retailer and its customers make it possible to implement this real-time demand response.
B. ELECTRICITY SUPPLY SOURCES FOR RETAILERS
There are various electricity supply sources in an electricity market. Retailers need to make decisions about which kinds of electricity sources and how much electricity they procure. In this paper, electricity sources are divided into two types: Option I: cheaper but uncertain, and Option II: more expensive but certain. Without loss of generality, the cost of electricity from the energy sources is modeled by a linear function of the procured electricity. In Option I, the cost function can be defined as:
where x denotes the electricity procured by the retailer and C m is the price for a unit of electricity. We assume that only xβ electricity received by the retailer, where
is realization factor. This cost function can be used for modeling various electricity sources, such as self-production microgrids. In the smart grid, various methods (such as electricity storage) have been used in the renewable energy generation or wholesale sides to increase the value of realization factor β. In our analysis, we assume that the retailer knows the distribution of the realization factor β beforehand. When such information is not available, the retailer can learn the distribution over time through machine learning [30] , where the retailer uses the realization factor of previous time slots to update the distribution of β. The cost function of Option II can be defined as:
where x denotes the electricity procured by the retailer, and C g is the price for a unit of electricity. The above two cost functions are quite general and can be extended to the situations where the actual usage follows other empirical distribution functions.
C. A FOUR-STAGE STACKELBERG GAME MODEL
Each electricity retailer needs to make decisions about how much electricity to procure, from which sources, and what price to offer to customers in order to maximize its profit. The customers then adjust their electricity demands based on the price offered by the retailer. In this paper, we assume that electricity source Option I is cheaper than electricity source Option II. The proposed Stackelberg game model can be easily adjusted for different situations. The retailer will make sequential decisions illustrated in Fig. 1 to maximize its profit, for the following reasons: first, the retailer should procure electricity from electricity source Option I first, and then procure electricity from electricity source Option II only if Option I does not provide enough electricity. If the retailer makes all three decisions simultaneously, it is likely to overprocure expensive electricity to avoid having too little electricity when is small. Second, making price decisions at the same time as procurement decisions makes it harder to ensure that the electricity supply equals the electricity demand. In order to capture these characteristics, we model and analyze the interactions between a retailer and its customers as a four-stage Stackellberg game [31] illustrated in Fig. 1 as follows:
EMERGING TOPICS IN COMPUTING
• Stage I: The electricity retailer, as the Stackelberg leader, first decides the amount of electricity E m procured from electricity source Option I with realization factor β.
• Stage II: The retailer then decides the amount of electricity E g procured from electricity source Option II, based on the received electricity level in stage I.
• Stage III: The retailer decides the real-time price p to offer to the customers based on the total electricity supply.
• Stage IV: The customers, who are the followers in the Stackelberg game, adjust their individual electricity demand to maximize their individual utility. In our paper, we assume that the realization factor β follows a uniform distribution in [0, 1]. However, the main engineering insights are still held with arbitrary distributions of realization factor β. In the following, we will analyze this four-stage Stackelberg game, and show how various system parameters affect the decisions. 
III. FOUR-STAGE STACKELBERG GAME ANALYSIS
A common solution concept for a multi-stage Stackelberg game is the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) [32] . Backward induction, which captures the sequential dependence of the decisions in the stages of the game, is a general method to determine the SPE [32] , [33] . We first analyze how the customers adjust their individual electricity demand to maximize their utility based on the price offered by the retailer in stage IV. Then we analyze how the retailer makes real-time price decisions in stage III. We finally analyze the retailer's procurement decisions in stage II and in stage I.
A. REAL-TIME ELECTRICITY DEMAND IN STAGE IV
In this stage, customers determine their electricity demands given the unit price p announced by the retailer in stage III, which has been explained in Subsection II-A. We assume that the retailer knows individual customers' consumption patterns and preferences.
B. OPTIMAL REAL-TIME PRICING STRATEGY IN STAGE III
The retailer's profit, the difference between the revenue generated from selling the electricity and total cost of procuring the electricity, can be calculated as follows:
since the retailer can only satisfy the electricity demand up to its supply. In this stage, the retailer needs to determine the optimal price to offer the customers, considering the total demand in (3) and the total electricity supply received in stages I and II, in order to maximize the profit. Therefore, the largest possible profit in stage III can be calculated as follows:
Maximizing the retailer's profit is the same as maximizing its revenue, since the amounts of electricity E m and E g are given and therefore the total cost C m E m + C g E g is already fixed in this stage. Therefore, the optimal price should meet the following requirement:
Let us define electricity demand D( p) = p i∈I D i ( p) and electricity supply S( p) = p(E m β + E g ). Fig. 2 shows three possible relationships between D( p) and S( p), depending on the total electricity supply E m β + E g . Three possible choices of S( p) are described as S j ( p)(j = 1, 2, 3). The relationships are as follows: D( p) . In this regime, the total electricity supply is higher than the total electricity demand at the optimal price. Therefore, in the excessive supply regime, some electricity is left unsold. In the conservative supply regime, the revenue of the retailer is maximized at the unique intersection point of D( p) and S( p).
Theorem 1: The optimal electricity price and the corresponding maximum profit of the retailer in Stage III can be summarized in Table 1 .
Proof: Taking the second derivative of D( p), we get
Therefore, D( p) is a concave function over p, and is maximized when p = 
2G . S( p) is linearly increasing function over p.
When 
, S( p) intersects with D( p). min(D( p), S( p)) is maximized at the intersection point, where price
p = F−E m β−E g G . When
C. OPTIMAL ELECTRICITY PROCUREMENT STRATEGY IN STAGE II
In this stage, the retailer decides the amount of electricity E g procured from Option II given the amount of electricity E m β obtained in stage I to maximize its profit, which can be described as follows:
The above problem can be decomposed into two following subproblems based on the two supply regimes in Table 1 . The first subproblem is to choose E g such that the total electricity supply falls into the excessive supply regime in stage III, which can be described as follows:
The second subproblem is to choose E g such that the total electricity supply falls into the conservative supply regime in stage III, which can be described as follows:
Theorem 2: The optimal amount of electricity to procure and the corresponding maximum profit of the retailer in stage II can be summarized in Table 2 .
Proof: R ES
III in (11) linearly decreases with E g . Therefore, R ES III is maximized at the lower bound of the set (i.e., E * g = max{
, the obtained electricity from Option I at the first stage is already in the excessive supply regime. Therefore, it is optimal to not procure any electricity at this stage.
If 0 ≤ E m β ≤ F 2 , the optimal profit in (12) is always greater than or equal to that in (11) , and it is enough to only consider the conservative supply regime. Since
Therefore, R CS III is a concave function over
, the optimal amount of electricity procured from Option II is Table 2 includes case CS1, case CS2, and case ES3 with different value sections of E m β. The first two cases involve solving subproblem (12) in the conservative supply regime. The third case corresponds to the solution of subproblem (11) in the excessive supply regime. Although the procurement decisions of the retailer in cases CS2 and ES3 are the same, these two cases are listed separately since the retailer's profit in these two cases are different.
D. OPTIMAL PROCUREMENT STRATEGY IN STAGE I
In this stage, the retailer needs to decide optimal amount of electricity E m to procure from Option I in order to maximize its expected profit by taking realization factor β into account, which can be described as follows:
where R II (E m ) is the expected profit of the retailer in stage II. This above problem can be decomposed into the following three cases, based on the value of E m . In the first case (corresponds to case CS1 in Table 2 ), E m is less than or equal to
, therefore E m β is always less than or equal to F−GC g 2 for any value β. The expected profit of the retailer can be calculated as follows:
which is a linear function of E m . If C m > C g /2, the expected profit linearly decreases with E m . If C m < C g /2, the expected profit linearly increases with E m . In the second case, E m is within the set (
. Therefore, E m β can be in either case CS1 or CS2 in Table 2 , depending on the value of β. The expected profit of the retailer can be calculated as follows:
The expected profit function in this case is a concave function, since its second-order derivative
as E m > F−GC g 2 . In the third case, E m is greater than F 2 . Therefore, E m β can be in any of the three cases in Table 2 , depending on the value of β. The expected profit of the retailer can be calculated as follows:
The expected profit function in this case is a decreasing function, since the first-order derivative (17) as E m > F 2 . Therefore, the expected profit function achieves maximum value when
The expected profit of the retailer can be summarized as follows:
Since the maximum value of the expected profit in the second case is always greater than the maximum profit in the third case, there is no need to consider the third case. This means that the retailer is either in case CS1 or case CS2 in stage II, and in the conservative supply regime in Stage III.
Theorem 3: The optimal procurement strategy of the retailer and its corresponding maximum expected profit in stage I can be summarized in Table 3 .
Proof: Table 3 includes two cases with different values of C m and C g .
When C m > C g 2 , the expected profit R II (E m ) reaches its maximum when E m = 0, which means that it is optimal for the retailer not to procure any electricity from Option I in this stage. In this situation, the retailer's maximal expected profit R H I only depends on the price of Option II. When C m ≤ C g 2 , the highest expected profit R L I can be calculated as follows: 
if E L * m lies in the interval of [
2 , depending on the value of the corresponding maximum expected profit. Therefore, the retailer's maximum expected profit R L I can be calculated as follows:
We summarize the retailer's equilibrium decisions from stage I to stage III and the equilibrium electricity demand of the customers in Table 4 . Several interesting observations about Table 4 
E. THE RETAILER'S REALIZED PROFIT
The retailer's profit, for a given realization factor β, is defined as realized profit in this paper. When the price provided by Option I is low (i.e., C m ≤ C g 2 ), the retailer's realized profit can be obtained base on the value of β. When the price of electricity Option I is high (i.e., C m > C g 2 ), the realized profit equals its expected profit R H I in Table 4 , since no electricity will be procured from Option I.
Theorem 4:
The retailer's realized profit is a strictly increasing function in realization factor β in the low cost regime.
Proof: When β is less than or equal to
, the realized profit can be calculated as follows:
which is linearly increasing with β. When β is greater than
which is increasing with β, since the first-order derivative of the profit function is:
as E L * m < F 2 .
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we present simulation results to show the effectiveness of the proposed game-theoretical decisionmaking scheme and how the system parameters affect the decisions. In the simulations, there is one retailer serving electricity to ten customers. The parameters of the utility functions for these customers are set as follows:
We first vary the price of electricity in Option I and Option II, and study how this affects the decisions of the retailer in stage I. Fig. 3 shows that for a given price C g in Option II, the optimal amount E * m is constant at the beginning and then decreases as price C m in Option I becomes higher, and drops to zero when C m ≥ C g 2 . Fig. 3 also shows that for a given price C m , the optimal amount E * m is non-decreasing with the increase of price C g , in which case procuring electricity from Option I becomes more attractive.
Next, we study how the decisions of the retailer in stage II are affected by price C g in Option II, and price C m and realization factor β in Option I. When price C m is greater than or equal to half of price C g , the optimal amount to procure from Option II only depends on price C g . Therefore, we only simulate the situation when price C m is less than half of price C g , corresponding to the low electricity price of Option I in Table 3 (denoted by ''L''). Fig. 4 shows that the optimal amount E * g procured from Option II decreases with the increase of realization factor β. The reason for this is that a higher value β means more electricity is obtained from Option I, therefore there is a less need to procure electricity from Option II. The figure also shows that the optimal amount E * g increases with the increase of price C m or the decrease of price C g , in which case procuring electricity from Option II becomes more attractive.
EMERGING TOPICS IN COMPUTING
We also investigate how the retailer's decisions in stage III change with price C g , price C m , and realization factor β. When price C m is greater than or equal to half of the price C g , optimal price only depends on price C g . Fig. 5 shows the simulation results when price C m is less than half of the price C g . The figure shows that optimal price p * is a constant (i.e., . This constant increases with price C g . When β is larger than a threshold
, optimal price p * decreases with the increase of the realization factor β. The threshold decreases with the increase of price C g or the decrease of price C m .
We then study how the retailer's procurement decisions with/without considering Option I affect its highest expected profit R I with the change of price C m . When C m ≥ C g 2 , expected profit does not depend on price C m . Fig. 6 shows that when C m < C g 2 , using our proposed decision-making scheme, the retailer achieves a higher expected profit than when only considering Option II. Fig. 6 shows the proposed decision-making scheme leads to a 1200% increase in profit when C m = 0.2. The figure shows that the highest expected profit decreases with the increase of price C m . When price C m equals half of price C g , the retailer decides not to procure electricity from this option, and then the expected profit becomes the same as the profit without considering Option I.
We study how each user's utility is affected by price C g , price C m , realization factor β and its characteristic parameters. When price C m ≥ C g 2 , each user's utility is constant with the increase of realization factor. Fig. 7 shows that for a user, the utility is constant at the beginning with the increase of realization factor β when price C m < C g 2 . The constant value decreases with price C g (i.e., the increase of optimal price p * offered to the user). When β is larger than
(decreasing with the value of price C g ), the user's utility increases, since optimal price p * offered by the retailer decreases with the increase of the realization factor β. The crossing situation shows that realization factor has more influence on users' utility when price C m is lower, and therefore a greater amount of electricity is procured from Option I. The figure also shows that a user's utility also increases with the characteristic parameter X i in its utility function. We also investigate how the variation of realization factor β with time affects the optimal price p * offered by the retailer when price C m is less than half of price C g . Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show that even though the realization factor changes frequently over time, the corresponding optimal price is not necessarily changing. This result shows that the retailer does not need to change the price offered to the users at every moment, which makes it possible for the proposed decision-making scheme to be implemented in the realworld applications. Fig. 8 shows that the optimal price only changes in 12 out 50 time slots, with cost C m = 0.98, and cost C g = 2.0. The reason is that since cost C m is higher, the retailer does not procure large amount of electricity from Option I. As a result, the variability of β has very small impact on the optimal price. Fig. 9 corresponds to the case where C m = 0.70, and C g = 2.0. As price C m is lower in Fig. 9 , the retailer procures more electricity from Option I, and the impact of β on price is higher. Fig. 9 shows that the price changes in 28 out of 50 time slots.
We also check how optimal realized profit is affected by price C g , price C m and realization factor β. Fig. 10 shows that the realized profit increases with β, if price C m is less than half of price C g . The crossing feature of the two increasing curves shows the realization factor β has a larger impact on the realized profit when price C m is low. When Option I is not considered in the procurement, the realized profit of the retailer is constant with the change of realization factor β.
The figure also shows that using our proposed decisionmaking scheme, the retailer can achieve a higher realized profit than when only considering Option II when β is higher than a certain level. We finally investigate how the realization factor β and prices C g and C m affect the realization utility of each user. Fig. 11 shows that the realization utility of a user is constant at the beginning, and then increases with β since the optimal price offered by the retailer starts to decrease. A lower C m provides a higher realization utility when the realized factor is high. The figure also shows the proposed decision-making scheme leads to a 430% increase in the user's realization utility when C g = 2.0 and C m = 0.5, compared to the scheme that does not consider Option I.
V. CONCLUSION
In a retail electricity market, retailers need to procure electricity from various electricity sources with different characteristics and then sell it to customers. Therefore, retailers need to make effective decisions about electricity sources, the electricity amount they procure and the price to offer to the customers. In the smart grid, real-time pricing DSM will be widely used to dynamically changing or shifting the electricity consumption, and new electricity supply resources might advert. Retailers need to consider the new characteristics of the smart grid when they make market decisions.
In this paper, we have proposed a novel game-theoretical decision-making scheme for electricity retailers in the smart grid with DSM. We used various utility functions to model electricity customers' preferences and consumption patterns. The interaction between a retailer and its customers has been modeled as a four-stage Stackelberg game. The first three stages of the game analyze how the retailer should make optimal procurement and price decisions in order to maximize its profit. The fourth stage of the game shows that how customers dynamically adjust their electricity demands with the price offered by the retailer to maximize their individual utility. Backward induction is used to determine the SPE of the four-stage Stackelberg game, since it captures the sequential dependence of the decisions in the stages of the game. Simulation results have been presented to show the effectiveness of the proposed scheme and how the system parameters affect the decisions.
In our future work, competition among the retailers will be added to the proposed scheme, and the scheme will be extended to situations where complete information about customers' utility and preferences cannot be obtained. In this situation, the system needs to be modeled as a dynamic game with incomplete information. More elaborate economic models such as screening and signalling [34] become relevant.
